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INTRODUCTION
The purpose  of this paper is to give an  overview of Canadian agricultural  policies
and to provide  background information on our current trade issues and disputes.  To make
this  task more  manageable,  discussion will  focus only  on  the major  policy instruments.
For  these  we  will examine  their  design  and  provide  some  quantitative  evidence  of the
transfers  they  generate  to  farmers,  in  order  to  provide  some  background  to  the  larger
border  issues  that exist.
There  are many ways  to look  at the  country's  agricultural  policies.  For example,
we  could review  policies  on  an  instrument  by  instrument  basis,  or review  each  of the
major  commodities  and  discuss  the  instruments  that  are  involved.  Instruments  will  be
discussed  first  since  it  is  the  instrumentation  that  often  generates  the  trade  dispute.
Second,  the set of policies  in place for each commodity  subsector are  reviewed  and some
quantitative  estimates of their  effects  are  provided.
An attraction  of reviewing  policy instruments  is that it should allow a comparative
analysis of policies in the two countries.  What makes  a Canada-United  States comparison
interesting  is  that  there  is  so  much  similarity  in  the  agricultural  and  economic
environments,  in  the trends  in  important  economic  variables,  and  in  the  problems  and
issues  facing policy  makers  in both  countries.  Yet the  policy  responses  have  been,  and
continue  to  be,  quite different.
The policy  groups  that are examined  include safety nets or stabilization programs,
direct  output  and  input  subsidies,  market  regulations  and  institutions,  which  include
important  elements  of trade  policy,  and the  diverse  collection of remaining  policies  that
are  of  secondary  importance  from  an  aggregate  perspective  but  may  be  of primary
importance  in a particular  industry.  These  include trade policies, research,  extension and
inspection  services,  and  the  variety  of  smaller  financial  transfers  that  go  to  various
agricultural  sectors  from  the  federal  and provincial  governments.
Four  commodity  groupings  will  be  discussed  which  cover  most  of  Canadian
agriculture:  the  red  meats  sector,  grains  and  oilseeds,  the  supply-managed  sector  that
includes dairy, poultry  and eggs,  and the horticultural  sector.  These  four  groups accountProceedings
for  205,000  farms  out  of a  total  of 230,000  farms  with  sales  in  excess  of $10,000,  or
about 88  percent of all farms.  In terms of gross  cash receipts,  these  four groups  account
for  $23.7  billion out  of $26.4  billion (90  percent  of total  gross  farm  sales).
Some  summary  statistics  for  1993  give  an  overview of the  Canadian  agricultural
sector.  First,  the industry's  farm  cash receipts  from market  sources  were  $21.5  billion,
and this primary  part of the food sector accounted for about 2 percent of GDP.  In nominal
terms,  the trend  in market returns over the  five years  from  1988  to  1992  was +6  percent,
but this is  equivalent to  a small decline  in real terms.  Net cash  income  and  realized  net
income are  also falling  on trend  in real  terms.  (AAFC,  1995).  Similarly  the proportion
of GDP  from  primary  agriculture  has  been  falling,  from  about  3 percent  in  the  early
1980s, as is found  in all growing countries.  The food processing  sector is roughly double
the size  of the  farm  sector  in sales  ($40 billion)  and  also contributes  5 percent  to GDP.
The agri-food  industry  as  a whole accounts  for  8 percent of GDP and  15  percent of total
jobs.
With technical  change  in  farm  production  continuing  unabated,  real  commodity
prices  are declining  on trend  in most  farm  commodities.  There  is also  a trend  to larger
farms,  as is observed  in the United  States,  although with a lag-the current average  farm
size is smaller  in Canada than in the United  States.  The  result is a steady but attenuating
decline  in the  number  of farmers  as  a combination  of new technologies  and  particularly
higher  wage  rates  make  larger  farms  more  economical.  The  exit  of  farmers  from
agriculture  is occurring at the rate of one in three operators  every five  years.  The number
of new  entrants  replacing  those  leaving  is  smaller,  but  the difference  between  the  two
groups  is  diminishing.  All  of this  is very  similar  to the  situation  in  the  United  States
(Statistics  Canada,  Farming  Facts,  1993).
In trade, Canada exports about one-third  of domestic production, and when primary
commodities are  combined with processed exports,  the total export value  is $13 billion in
1992  and  1993.  Canada  has  a  positive  trade  balance  in  primary  products  ($6  vs.  $3
billion)  and  a  negative  trade  balance  for  processed  products  ($6.9  vs.  7.3  billion).
However,  like the United States, Australia  and New Zealand,  Canada's  share of the  total
global  market  for  agri-food  exports  has  declined  since  the  1961-65  period.  (AAFC,
September  1994).
Government financial  support has been declining  from the record high levels of the
late  1980s  and early  1990s.  Since  1980  the real path  of federal  government  expenditure
rose  gradually  from  1980  to  1985,  rose  dramatically  for the next two  years, declined  for
three  years to  1990 and jumped to an all-time high in 1991.  These very high expenditures
in the  1986-91  period were primarily due to special ad hoc farm  income support payments
to  assist  the grains  and  oilseeds  sector  to  maintain  income  levels  in  the  face  of lower
world market prices during the  grain trade  "war" of that period.  Since then, expenditures
have  declined,  but  1994/95  levels  in  real  terms  are  still  higher  than  those  in  the  early
1980s.  A  feature  of  government  expenditures  in  agriculture  in  Canada  is  that  the
provinces  are  also heavily  involved,  particularly  in the areas of income  support and rural
development,  extension,  education,  and  environment.
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AGRICULTURAL  POLICY  LANDSCAPE
Goals
Review of the agricultural  policy landscape in Canada, should start with the general
goals motivating  the  policies.  The  following  five  goals  are  identified  for agriculture  by
the  current  government,  with  the  first  two  emphasizing  growth  and  the  second  three
emphasizing  security:
*  achieving  sustainable  agriculture  and agri-food  growth
*  fostering  rural opportunities
*  realizing  long-term  financial  security
*  attaining  resource  and  environmental  sustainability
*  maintaining  a safe,  high quality  food supply.
From  such a list of current policy goals some  changes are evident from the situation
in  the  1970s  and  early  to  mid-1980s.  In  the  early  1980s  a  listing  of  goals  on  the
consumer  side  would  include  reasonable  and  stable  food  prices,  and  adequate,  safe,
nutritious  and  dependable  food  supplies.  On  the producer  side,  the  list would  include  a
fair level and stability of producer returns,  reduced economic disparities within agriculture,
increased production  efficiency,  expanded  production,  the promotion  of exports,  and the
preservation  of the  family  farm.  In  the  reality of programs  and  regulations,  the  number
of underlying  objectives  could  be thinned to  two,  increased  stability and increased  farm
incomes.  The  other  objectives  have  existed but in practice  they  played a secondary  role.
To view  this  issue  (policy  objectives)  differently,  Warley  (1985)  organized  agricultural
policy  objectives  into  two  groups,  "development-oriented,  productivity  enhancing,  and
competitiveness-promoting"  and  "protectionist,  preservationist  and  adjustment-
ameliorating".  The  period  from  1970  to the mid-1980s  witnessed the  ascendancy of the
latter  group of objectives,  with increased  intervention.  More recently,  language,  such  as
that noted above,  reflects  a  greater concern  with  developmental  objectives.
One  common  element  between the goals  of the  1970s and the  current  listing is the
attention  given  in both cases to stabilization. This reveals  what may be  a unique element
of Canadian  agricultural  policy,  the  sustained  priority  given  to  this  goal.  The  public
rhetoric of agricultural policy in most developed countries also puts great emphasis  on the
goal  of stabilizing  markets,  prices  and  incomes.  But most  of the resulting  policies have
little to  do with stabilization  and a  great deal  to  do with increasing  levels  of farm  prices
and  incomes.  Canadian  agricultural  policy appears  somewhat  different in this regard.  As
noted above, stability  is consistently  stated as  a policy objective  and receives  even greater
emphasis  in  policy  rhetoric  than  in  other  countries.  More  important,  a  number  of
agricultural  policies,  usually  at  the  federal  and  federal-provincial  levels,  actually  seem
designed  to  increase  stability  and  reduce  market  risks.  The  historical  reason  for  this
attention  could  be  due  to  Canada's  climate  and  inherently  large  weather  risks,  its
dependence  on world markets  for  many years,  or a thinness of markets  resulting  in fewer
insurance  options.  This  is not to say that farm  income or price levels are unimportant  in
Canadian  policy  but  that  stabilization  goals  are  taken  seriously  and  instruments  are
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designed  and  used  largely  to  meet  such  an  objective.'  This  will  become  more  evident
later  in this paper.
There  are  other  differences  in the  goals  now  mentioned  in  comparison  with  the
situation  in the  early  1980s.  First,  there  is an  increased  importance  of competitiveness,
at  least as  an important  criterion  for policy adoption.  This  is  reflected  in  the  desire  to
increase  exports,  the  statement  that  financial  security  in  the  industry  must  come
increasingly  from  the  market  place,  not  governments,  and  that  policies  should  be non-
distorting  so  that  farmers  will adjust  to  market  signals.  There  is  an explicit  desire  for
agricultural  policies  to  foster  economic  growth  in  the  agricultural  sector  instead  of
providing  passive income  support.
Sustainability  in agricultural production  has now become a stated goal that was not
often  mentioned  a  decade  ago,  indicating  the  increased  importance  of  environmental
issues.  For  example,  there  has  been  greater  attention  given to production  externalities
where  agricultural  activities  (e.g.,  waste  disposal)  damage  water  quality  and  other
resources,  and a  desire to  limit agricultural  activities  in order to preserve  certain  "public
goods" (such  as biodiversity  or waterfowl  habitat)  that are judged to be socially valuable.
Risk  management by  farmers  through  market  mechanisms  has begun to replace reliance
upon government  programs  to reduce risk.  Clearly,  there is a smaller role for government
expenditure  in current  policy goals,  and greater emphasis  on the market place as  well as
on the farmer becoming more self-reliant  and more responsible  for managing his/her own
situation.
Type of Policies  in Place
On a quick review,  the policy landscape  in Canada today appears to be quite similar
to the  situation  of  10-15  years  ago.  At that  time,  the  dominant  features  of agricultural
policy  in  Canada  were  the  supply  management  regime  covering  dairy  and  poultry
products,  a  number  of  stabilization  programs  that  were  evolving  into  the  National
Tripartite  Stabilization  Program,  and  a  grains  policy  that  featured  a  one-desk  selling
marketing  board along with a significant transportation subsidy.  The important  secondary
element  was  the large  and  increasing  role of provincial  government  support  programs,
which were  often  direct financial  transfers  in the form  of an output or input  subsidy.  To
a  certain  extent,  this  is  still  the  case  today.  The  major  program  initiatives  remain  the
same, albeit with some  important changes  in their details, and no new initiatives  have been
begun  that  cannot  be  seen  in  some  form  in  1986.  For  details  and  an  overview  of
programs  in  effect  earlier  in  the  1980s,  see  Arcus  Consulting  Limited  (1985),  and
Barichello  (1986).
However,  there has been more  change in the policy framework than  initially meets
the  eye.  Driving these  changes  are  a  set  of  underlying  fundamentals,  the  two  most
important of which are (i)  a tighter government  budget constraint and (ii)  a more open and
informed  international  trading  environment  that  constrains  trade  policies  to  be  less
' Editors Note:  One reviewer observed  that there  has been no stabilization  program in Canada
that has  not  also had  a  significant  income  enhancement effect.
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protective  and  less  damaging  to  trading  partners  and  international  markets.  These
pressures  have become  particularly  concentrated  in the  last year,  with agreement  on  the
Uruguay  GATT Round and with the  current  federal  and provincial  governments'  special
attention  to its deficit.  The need to  focus  government  resources  more  carefully  and  the
increased  offshore  competition  has  led  to  a  greater  concern  with  the  international
competitiveness  of our  agricultural  subsectors.
The  importance  of smaller  budgets  and  more  open  trading  rules  is  provoking  a
sometimes  rapid  and substantial  change in policies in Canada.  Most  of the major budget
items  in the  programs  discussed below  are either  disappearing  or being  reformed.  Even
in the supply management areas, although prohibitive tariffs have replaced restrictive Non-
Tariff  Barriers  (NTBs),  the  mechanism  for  changing  support  levels  is  fundamentally
altered,  and  it is only  a  matter  of time  until these  changes will affect  producers  directly
by  lowering  prices.  Depending  upon  the  outcome  of  certain  legal  and  international
decisions,  the  very  high  tariffs  on  trade  within North  America  may  be  reduced  rather
quickly after  the  year  2001.  All of this  is  occurring  as  the  agricultural  sector  itself is
continuing  to  undergo  substantial  changes  due  to  the  increased  importance  of  new
information  in production  and marketing, the rapid transmission  of this knowledge among
trading partners  and competitors,  and the  resulting increased  international  competition.
The  result  is  that  the  policy  framework  and  industry  structure  in  Canada  are
changing relatively  rapidly and  in a  quite  different  direction  than was the case  a  decade
ago.  This change-in the  direction  of less regulation,  less government  financial  support
and  greater reliance  on markets-may  now be occurring  more  rapidly  in Canada than  in
the  United  States.  It  also  may  be the  case  that  certain  parts  of Canadian  agricultural
policy  had  further  to  go  in this direction.
REVIEW OF  POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Safety  Net  Programs and  Stabilization Policy
There  is a  long history  of stabilization or  farm  safety  net programs,  beginning  in
1958  with  the Agricultural  Stabilization  Act.  From  that program  which  guaranteed  80
percent  of the previous  ten  years'  price,  a  series  of changes  were  made,  to  deal  with
inflation,  gross revenues  and gross  margins instead  of only  market price,  and incorporate
shorter base  periods.  Payments  were still made  like deficiency  payments but the funding
source was broadened to include both federal  and provincial  governments,  and producers.
In  1991,  an  umbrella  statute  (Farm  Income  Protection  Act,  FIPA)  provided  a  general
framework  for stabilization programs  that was to integrate  the safety  nets for virtually  all
commodities.  All programs  under this  framework  were  guided by  five  principles:
i)  market  neutrality;
ii)  equity  among commodities  and  recognition  of regional  diversity;
iii)  long-term  social  and  economic  sustainability  of farm  families;
iv)  consistency  with  international  obligations;  and
v)  long-term  economic  and environmental  sustainability.
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Four  safety  net programs  have  been  developed  under this  legislation to cover  the
different  needs  of different  products.  They  are  a  revenue  insurance  program  (National
Tripartite Stabilization Program,  NTSP),  a gross revenue insurance program  (GRIP),  a net
income  stabilization account program  (NISA),  and a crop  insurance  program.  All share
the  following  common  characteristics;  they:
*  stabilize  farmer  incomes  through market  risk  or yield protection;
*  are tripartite  among federal  and  provincial  governments  and producers,  and  the  costs
of the program  plus its management  and program  development  are  shared among  the
three  parties to  the agreement;
*  are national,  not  regional,  in scope;
* are  voluntary  with  farmers  who  may  sign  up  for  any,  all,  or  a  combination  of the
programs;
* are  established through  federal-provincial  agreements;
* are  administered  and  funded  through  Agriculture  and  Agri-Food  Canada,  and  other
government  departments;
* promote  equity  among regions  and  producers;  and
*  address  short term  production  and  market  risks while permitting  farmers  to  adjust  to
long-term  price and  market  trends.
This  family  of safety  net programs  is  important  in  Canadian  agricultural  policy,
although the first two programs,  respectively,  are no longer in effect or are  unlikely to be
continued.  To  illustrate  the  evolution and  nature  of safety net  policy, the four programs
are  summarized  below.
National  Tripartite Stabilization  Program (NTSP)  The  objective  of the NTSP is
to  reduce  losses  to  producers  due  to  adverse  changes  in  market  prices  or  costs.  It  is
applied to hogs, cattle,  lambs, some  fruits  and vegetables  (apples,  beans  and onions),  and
honey.  The  premia  are  shared equally  (one-third  each)  by the two  levels of government
(federal  and  provincial),  and  producers.  After  being  in place  for  about  a  decade,  this
program  is  now  winding  down.  Most  commodity  NTSP  schemes  are  ended,  or  in the
process  of being ended.
The details  of this program reveal some of the thinking that underlies  its operation.
For hogs, slaughter and feeder cattle, the program  guarantees  a specified percentage of the
average  gross  margin  over the  last  five  years.  The  support  level  is  equal to estimated
national  current  cash  costs  in  that  quarter,  plus a  percentage  of the  difference  between
these cash  costs and the national  average market  price for the  preceding  five  years  (i.e.,
the  average  gross  margin).  The program  for cattle terminated  at the  end of 1993  and the
hog program  ended in July  1994.  To give an idea of the degree  of financial  support this
program  offered, the hog program paid an average of $120 million per year, and payments
in excess of $10  million were  made  in four of the  seven years  from  1988  to  1994.  The
average  payment  for  slaughter  cattle  in total was  $51  million  per year,  and  the  average
payment to feeder calves was  $2 million per year.  Finally,  the cow-calf program was  set
up a little differently,  focusing on market price alone  instead of a gross  margin.  Support
levels  were  set as  a given  percentage  of an indexed  (for  inflation)  moving average  price
of calves  over the last  10  years  (i.e.,  the  ten  year  average  real  price  of calves).  From
1988  to  1993,  no payments  were  made  on this part of the NTSP.
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It should be noted that these numbers  are the payments  actually made to producers,
ex post, net of the premium contributions  made by producers,  averaged  in nominal terms
over the  1988-1994 period.  Therefore,  they are not directly  comparable with the financial
transfers  presented  in  the Commodity-by-Commodity  Review  section  at the  end  of this
paper.  Those financial  transfers were calculated  as the sum of federal  and provincial plans
self-financing  (completely  financed  from  premium  contributions  alone).  The  financial
transfer  data are  also  for the  1992  year  only.
Gross  Revenue  Insurance Plan  (GRIP)  This  program  was the  successor  to the
Western  Grain  Stabilization  Act  and  was  introduced  in  1991.  It  was offered  to  grain,
oilseed  and  specialty  crop  growers.  It  was  designed  to  be  complementary  to  Crop
Insurance,  with the two programs providing comprehensive  revenue protection.  With crop
insurance  giving yield protection,  based  upon historical  production,  GRIP  adds  revenue
protection based on prices, with reference  to a fifteen year indexed  moving average price.
Target  revenues  per  acre  were calculated  using probable  yields  (farmers'  past  historical
production)  and  average  real  price.  Payments  to  producers  are  triggered  when  market
revenue  falls  short of target  revenue.  Premia  are  calculated  each year,  designed to make
the  plan self-sustaining.  These premia  are shared  by the  three participants,  with  33  1/3
percent  paid  by  producers,  41  2/3  percent  paid  for  by  the  federal  government,  and  25
percent paid  by provincial  governments.  Participation  is voluntary-in  1994,  70 percent
of eligible  producers  were  enrolled  (covering  73  percent of acreage).
However,  participation  is  declining  and  farmers  are  choosing  reduced  coverage.
The  federal  government  is  reconsidering  its participation,  partly  for  trade  reasons  and
because  Alberta  and  Saskatchewan,  the  largest  two  participating  provinces,  are
terminating  their  involvement.  To  give  some  idea  of  the  financial  commitment
represented  by  GRIP, the federal  government  contribution  is about  $500  million annually
and the total  government transfer,  federal  and provincial including specialty  crops as well
as  grains  and  oilseeds,  was  $936  million  in  1992,  excluding  federal  government
contributions  to  the plan's administration.
Crop  Insurance  This  program  provides  specified  protection  against  production  risks,
including such hazards as  drought,  flood,  hail, frost, excessive  moisture  and insects.  It is
offered  in  conjunction  with  GRIP  or as  a  stand-alone  program.  Payouts  are  triggered
when  a farmer's  yield  falls below  70-80  percent of that  farm's  average  historical  yield,
due to any of the hazards  listed, with  the details depending upon the province.  Premiums
are calculated  in an actuarially  sound  manner so the  scheme  is intended  to be  financially
self-sustaining.  Costs are  shared by the three participant  groups with the shares being  25
percent  for  each  of  the  federal  and  provincial  governments  and  50  percent  for  the
producer.  Participation  is  at  55-60  percent  of  the  eligible  acreage  and  number  of
producers.  The  federal  cost  of premiums  has  averaged  about $160  million  over the  last
6  years.  In  1992,  the  combined  federal  and  provincial  transfer  (via  premium
contributions)  across  all  commodities  was  $258  million.
Net Income Stabilization Account  (NISA)  This program  is probably the most unique  of
the  four  stabilization  programs  and  has  the potential  of becoming  the  most  important,
given the expectation that it will be classified as  a "GATT-green"  program.  It is designed
43Proceedings
to  give  farmers  another  tool  in  financial  management,  like  a special  "rainy day"  savings
account  where  you  set  aside  funds  in  good  years  for  use  in  poor years.  A  participant
farmer  can  deposit  up  to  2  percent  of eligible  net  sales,  to  a  maximum  sales  level of
$250,000.  This  amount will be  matched  by  1 percent contributions  by  both federal  and
provincial  governments.  Producers  can contribute  up to 20 percent on additional  sales but
such  contributions  attract  no  matching  government  contributions.  Interest  is  earned  on
these  individual  accounts  at  competitive  interest  rates,  plus  3  percent  provided  by
government.  Withdrawals  can be made when the  gross margin  for the entire farm  is less
than  the  5 year  historical  average,  or when  the  income  level  from  all  sources  is  below
some  minimal  level.
This program  takes  a whole farm  approach;  it was not  intended to  be commodity
specific.  Overall  farm  income  from  included  commodities  is used  for  calculations  and
these are  done on an individual  farm  basis.  At present,  farms  in grains,  oilseeds,  special
crops,  horticulture  and  honey are  eligible,  as determined  by  each province.  So  far  the
contribution  levels  are  relatively  small.  The  federal  cost  in  1992  and  1993  was  in the
$65-$75  million  range.  Across  all  commodities  and  including  both  governments,  the
transfer  for  1992  was $110  million.  In line with the ongoing evolution of this program,
steps  are now  being taken to simplify  its procedures  and  administration.
Future of Safety  Net  Policy
Safety net policy is to be a primary vehicle of overall agricultural policy in Canada.
As  such  it must contribute  to  a  set of larger policy  objectives  for  Canadian  agriculture,
including  promoting  long  run viability  and  competitiveness  of the  sector,  and  helping
farmers  to  adjust to  market  signals and  manage  risks  in  a non-distorting  fashion.  It is
intended  to  involve  whole-farm  income  stabilization  rather  than  historical  commodity
income  support.  The family  of safety net programs  is to include three specific programs:
crop  insurance,  a whole  farm  income program  like NISA,  and  more  specific companion
programs  that  would  deal  with  disasters,  other  regional  needs,  farm  adjustment  and
adaptation  measures,  and  risk  management.  The  current  programs  are  being  actively
reformed  to  ensure  that,  among  other  objectives,  they  are  compatible  with  trade
agreements,  do  not  alter  production  decisions  toward  certain  outputs,  inputs  or
technologies  or  market  allocations  (compared  to the  absence  of the program),  are  self-
financing  and affordable.  The  government  financing  component  will involve 60 percent
federal  funding  and  40  percent  provincial.  Policy  design  issues  that  remain  to  be
determined  include  whether  producer  deposits  should be  based on  sales  or value-added,
whether  funding should be increased  and  the  interest bonus  reduced,  and if there  should
be contribution  limits  or caps  on  fund balances.
Given the importance  of  this class of programs,  what can we say about their overall
economic  effects,  at  least  in  qualitative  terms?  First,  the programs  are  basically  risk
reduction  programs.  At  present  this  involves  changing  the  price  distribution  faced  by
farmers  by  increasing  prices  at  the  low end,  thereby  raising the effective  average  prices
received.  This  likely  generates  some  increased  production,  although  with  the  scale  of
subsidy relative to market  returns,  the actual  increase  is not  likely to be  large except for
GRIP,  which  involved  financial  transfers  of  almost  one  billion  dollars  in  1992.  By
44Barichello
conscious  design,  the  reformed  safety  net  policy  will  be  less  subsidized,  hence  less
distorting,  and  with  less  of a  commodity  market  effect  by  focusing  on  whole  farm
incomes,  not commodity-specific  prices or revenues.  It would appear that the distortions
will be quite  small,  and that,  in turn,  these reformed  safety  nets programs  will cause few
trade  difficulties.  Of course,  the  details  of these  programs  are  everything  in  analyzing
them;  more  substantial  comments  must await  information  on the  actual  program  details
including the  size of the  subsidy and the relation  between price movements  and payments
to  farmers  to  determine  the  farm-level  incentives  they  give  to  individual  commodity
producers.
DIRECT SUBSIDY  PROGRAMS
Output Subsidies
In contrast  to U.S.  farm programs,  Canadian agricultural policy does not often use
this policy  instrument.  Safety  net programs  until  now  have  included  only  conditional
deficiency  payments  working  on  the  lower  end  of the price  distribution,  and  even these
payments  will  be ended with the current  safety net policy  reform.  The  two exceptions  to
this generalization  arise  in dairy policy.  First, there  is an offer-to-purchase  program  that
operates  on butter  and skim milk powder to  underwrite the  prices  for these commodities,
and in so doing put a floor on industrial milk prices in general.  There  is also a deficiency
payment  used  in dairy  policy to  provide  a  direct  subsidy on  industrial  milk.  It was  at a
level  of $6/hectolitre  through  1992/93  (one-sixth  to  one-seventh  of the industrial  milk
price),  and has  since declined  to  $5.40/hl  in  1994/95.  This subsidy  is not  open-ended; it
is paid  only on  the base of industrial  milk quotas.  It  is an  important part  of dairy policy
but  is  being re-examined  as  part  of redesigning Canada's  post-Uruguay  Round  "orderly
marketing  system".  In fact, in the February  28,  1995 budget,  this subsidy  will be reduced
by  30 percent  over the  next two  years.
Another  area  where  output  subsidies  have  been  used  is  as  part  of  provincial
agricultural  policy in some  provinces  such  as  Quebec  and British  Columbia.  However,
the situation now is substantially changed compared  to  that of the mid-1970s,  when these
provincial price  supports (via deficiency  payments)  were widespread  and large,  incurring
countervail  trade actions and creating  more inequity  in support between  provinces.  Now,
most  such programs  are being  terminated  or adjusted to  comply  with trade  agreements.
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Input Subsidies
These instruments  have been used quite commonly  in Canadian agricultural policy.
The most  important  input subsidy  has been that  on transporting Western grain  exports to
export port, known  more  recently  as  the  Western  Grain  Transportation  Act (WGTA). 2
Western  Grain Transportation Act  This subsidy has its  origins  in 1897  legislation fixing
the freight rate on moving grain to export position at the so-called  Crow Rate.  This fixed
nominal freight charge became an increasingly  significant benefit to Prairie grain farmers
as inflation  occurred  and underlying  freight costs  increased.  It was reformed  and capped
in  the  mid-1980s  with the  enactment  of the  Western  Grain  Transportation  Act whereby
the  federal  government  assumed  the  costs  of the  fixed rate  at a  level  equivalent  to  the
1981  value of the subsidy benefit,  about $700 million, paid annually to the railways.  This
method of payment, however, also meant that grains  in the Prairies  were priced artificially
high  (as the export price f.o.b.  Vancouver or Thunder Bay less the artificially  low cost of
freight).  The  result  was that  the  WGTA  taxed  livestock  production,  especially  feedlot
operations  on the Prairies,  and it discouraged  increased value-added or further  processing
of grain because processed  grain products  did not receive the freight subsidy.  In addition,
the  subsidy  was  an  export subsidy  and hence  contrary to  Canada's  GATT  obligations.
The  size  of this subsidy  is  among  the  largest of any  single program  in Canadian
agriculture.  From  1989  to  1992  the  cost  to  the  federal  government  was  about  $725
million per  year, equivalent to  about $20 per tonne  of grain  in  freight costs.  Given the
distortions  and  inequities  this  subsidy  causes  within  the  agricultural  sector,  its
incompatibility  with basic GATT  articles  and  its large  budget commitments,  it has  been
a  candidate  for  reform  or  elimination  ever  since  the  WGTA  was  announced.  In  the
February  28,  1995  Budget, the program was  eliminated.  It will be replaced  by a one-time
payment  to  Prairie  grain  land owners  of $1.6  billion to  offset  partially  the  drop  in  land
values  expected from  termination  of such  a long-standing  benefit.  As this payment will
be  tax-free,  its value to farmers  is claimed to be about $2.2 billion, while termination  will
generate for the Government of Canada annual savings of $560 million beginning August
1995.
Feed Freight Assistance  Although  it  is  relatively  minor  in  terms  of outlay, the  Feed
Freight  Assistance  Program  (FFA)  is  another  freight  subsidy  program.  In  contrast  to
WGTA which assists  cereal  growers  at the expense of grain users  in the grain  exporting
regions,  FFA  assists  livestock producers  in the  feed grain  deficit  areas.  It does  this  by
paying a portion of the transport  costs of shipping feed grains  to the feed importing  areas
of Atlantic  Canada,  B.C.,  and peripheral  regions of Ontario  and  Quebec.  It has  had the
effect of making livestock  feed cheaper and livestock  production more  profitable  in these
areas,  reducing  the comparative  advantage  of livestock  production  in the  Prairies.  The
average  subsidy was equivalent to $11-13  per tonne and  cost the federal  government  $17-
2 This  subsidy  reduces  net  freight  charges  to  the  farmer,  hence  is  included  among  input
subsidies.  But because  it operates beyond the farm gate  and raises  effective farm  gate prices,  from  a farm
perspective  it  appears  as  an  output  subsidy.  Its  allocation  to  the  Input  Subsidy  category  is  somewhat
arbitrary-it  could just as  well be  included  under  the section  above  on  Output Subsidies.
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18  million  over  the  1990-93  period.  However,  this  program  was  also  ended  in  the
February  28  budget with  a phase-out  over ten  years.
Credit Subsidies  The  last input subsidy to be discussed concerns credit.  There  are a great
variety of programs,  mostly provincial,  which provide some  form of subsidy  to credit for
farmers.  Typically  these  programs  are  focused  on a particular  type  of credit  (e.g,.  long
term  borrowing),  or  for  a specific  use of funds  (e.g.,  land  development).  There  are also
credit  components  to  other  programs  (e.g.,  for  replanting  fruit  trees)  that  are  harder  to
identify  as  credit.  The  extent  of these  programs  and  the  subsidy  element  have  been
reduced  within  the  last decade.  The  actual  financial transfer  in  each program  is usually
small, but the total amount transferred  in the  form of credit assistance becomes reasonably
significant due to the large number of such programs.  Federal credit programs  accounted
for  a transfer  of $7  million  in  1992,  while  provincial  and  federal-provincial  programs
labelled  as  "credit"  assistance  amounted  to  some  $75  million,  not  including  debt
restructuring  programs.  There  are also credit programs  for marketing  (e.g.,  export credit
in  the  form  of loan  guarantees)  and  processing  plant  assistance,  where  the  immediate
beneficiary  may  be firms  in the  post-farm  gate  sector  of the  food  system.
MARKET  REGULATIONS
One  of  the  distinguishing  features  of  Canadian  agricultural  policy  is  the
development  of marketing  boards,  beginning  as  early  as  the  1920s  and  1930s.  The
purpose  of these  boards  has  been  loosely  defined  as  the  "orderly  marketing"  of  the
agricultural  commodities  concerned.  As  in  the  United  States,  this  expression  usually
translates  as  the desire  to  stabilize  agricultural  markets  and  to improve  producer  prices,
particularly  the latter.  As they have  evolved  in Canada,  these  marketing boards have  had
the potential  for greater market power  and intervention than in the case of the closest U.S.
marketing institution counterpart,  marketing  orders.  These boards are very heterogeneous
in terms  of their  powers  and economic  effects,  making it necessary  in  analyzing them to
know a considerable amount of detail about their rules and procedures.  This heterogeneity
also  makes  it  difficult  to  generalize  about marketing  boards.
There  was  a major  development  in  the  evolution  of these  boards  during  the  late
1960s and  early  1970s when  some of them gained powers to restrict domestic  supply.  At
the  same time,  some received  import protection.  This  occurred  in the  dairy, poultry  and
egg  boards  and  these  commodity  groups  are  the  focus  of the  following  discussion  on
supply management marketing boards.  The powers these boards have acquired made them
one of the most significant set of marketing  interventions  in Canadian  agricultural  policy.
They  are also  one of the most  contentious policies within the  country  and with Canada's
trading  partners.
The  discussion  below  will  also  include  a  marketing  board  that  does  not  have
powers  of supply control,  but has other powers  in the grains  and oilseeds  sector that have
made it the  largest marketing  board  in the country-the  Canadian  Wheat  Board (CWB).
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Supply Management
Although  the details of operation  differ  among the  dairy,  poultry  and egg  boards,
their  basics  are  similar.  They  enjoy  three  important  powers,  two  of  which  are
independent.  First,  they  have  been  provided  protection  from  imports  through  import
quotas.3 In practice  imports  have been  held  to  very  low  levels,  between  zero  and  ten
percent of domestic  consumption.  The  use of these  quotas was  applied under the GATT
due to a subsection of Article  11  that permitted the  use of such import  restrictions  under
the condition that domestic production  was also restricted.  The second power  follows to
meet that condition,  a domestic  quota system to restrict domestic producers  to market less
than they  would prefer  at the  price levels established.  The third power  is the mechanism
to  set  domestic  prices,  where  it  is  based  on  a  cost-of-production  formula,  or  other
procedures  (e.g.,  public utility-type  hearings)  that give  significant weight  to changes  in
farm costs.  Typically  these formulae  do not reflect much technical change, with the result
that whatever profits were initially protected by the pricing formula, have grown over time
with  the ongoing  increases  in  farm  productivity.
The outcome of this situation is relatively high product prices  and at the  farm level,
either large rents  or inefficiency  due to high cost of production.  The powers these  boards
have  been  given have made them  into,  effectively,  a domestic  cartel.  As  is the  case  for
cartels,  a large  part of keeping the  supply management  regime  operating  is enforcement
of the quota restrictions.  In addition  to an  array  of penalties  and  levies for producing  in
excess of quota, many of the  regimes have allowed the  flexibility of individual producers
being able  to trade  the  quota rights.
With the quota giving access  to above-average  profitability,  the quotas  have taken
on values through  capitalization  of program  benefits.  With the  high product  prices  that
occur  in most  cases,  this has  led  to  quota prices  that  are  also  high by  most  regulatory
standards.  For example,  one can find milk  quota prices at  a level where the  cost of quota
needed  per  cow  is  roughly  ten  times  the  cost  of the  cow  itself.  One  result  is that  the
considerable  benefits  of this  regime  accrue  to  the  initial  holders  of the  quota.  New
entrants  must  pay  for  the  benefits  they  will  enjoy  through  the  costly  purchase  of the
necessary  quota, leaving them with no above average profits if they pay the  market price
for the quota.  Unlike the  case for new farmers  obtaining land for any farming enterprise,
typically there  is no  option for entrants  (or anyone else) to rent the quota.  This contrasts
the ability  of farmers  able  to  acquire  land for a  farming  enterprise through rental;  quota
is  not  allowed to  be rented  and not  much of a rental  market  exists.
Another  result  of the  high  prices  in  these  commodities  is  that  the  enforcement
problem  gets  tougher,  and  this  leads  to  more  restrictions,  and  in  some  cases  legal
challenges  to the managers of the  regime.  Most of these  complications  arise  in the  area
of quota allocation  and transfer procedures,  not in the area of marketing the product.  So
the  costs  of  dealing  with  the  extra  restrictions  and  legal  costs  are  at  the  expense  of
attention  and innovation  a variety of other areas of concern  to participants  in the industry
3 In fact,  the boards  do  not themselves control  imports  of the  supply-managed  commodities.
Rather,  the  federal  government  does  so  through  the  Department  of External  Affairs  using  the  Export
Import  Permits  Act and  the Import  Control  List.
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(including marketing),  and they reduce  the benefits that producers  would otherwise receive
from the  marketing  board  regime.
In  sum,  these  supply management  marketing board  regimes  are  characterized  by:
i)  high and relatively  stable  commodity  prices;
ii)  high prices  for the  farmers'  domestic  marketing  quota;
iii)  a complex  system  of regulations  and restrictions;  and
iv)  a regime  that is  not easy  to  operate  due to  enforcement  problems  and  legal
challenges.
These regulations,  restrictions,  enforcement  problems  and  legal challenges,  plus the need
to  dispose  of  surpluses,  eat  away  at  some  of  the  initial  rents  to  farmers.  Still,  the
remaining rents have been large enough to keep the  system intact, even if its management
is  rocky  and many  inefficiencies  creep  in.4
Other  difficulties  faced  by the supply management  regimes  come  from our trading
partners,  and the most substantial  challenge  has arisen through the recent Uruguay  Round
and  perhaps the  NAFTA.  Even  if this regime  does not  result in  significant  dumping  of
surplus  product  on  world  markets,  it  does  limit market  access  by  would-be  exporters.
Therefore,  there is a common  conclusion from our trading partners that if the regime were
not in  place,  there  would  be large  scale  importation  of the  product  in  question.  This  is
almost  certainly  a misconception.  High  domestic  prices  and  import  restrictions  do  not
necessarily  mean  high  domestic  supply  prices.  The  domestic  quotas  conceal  the  true
supply price  which may be  as  low as  the U.S.  supply price,  a conclusion that arises when
we share  common technologies and know-how, and most of our factor inputs are available
with small  or  no  trade barriers.  It  would  not be  outrageous  to  claim that some  supply
management  regimes  in  particular  regions  may  actually  restrict  exports  to  the  United
States  compared  to  a  lifting of supply management.
The  GATT  Uruguay  Round  (UR)  changes  the  underlying  economics  of supply
management  significantly.  The  import  quota has  been  replaced  with  tariffication,  and
initial over-quota  tariffs range  from about  150 to 350 percent.  These tariffs  are obviously
prohibitive, but they are  vulnerable to reductions,  either through  future GATT Rounds  or
through  the  application  of  NAFTA  tariff  reduction  provisions.  Also,  the  pricing
mechanism  will change  as  tariffs  fall in  the  future.  Once  tariff levels  become  less than
prohibitive, and that is only a matter of time,  it will be  the external  tariff on a world trade
price that will determine  prices.  However,  for the next six years, the  only change  due to
the Uruguay  Round will  be a  small  expansion  in  certain  import quotas.
The  issue  of whether  NAFTA  tariff  reduction  rules  will  apply  to  tariffs  newly
created by the UR remains  unresolved,  and it applies to a range of commodities,  including
the  supply  management  commodities  in  Canada  and  sugar  and  peanuts  in  the  United
States.  If the  NAFTA  rules  do  apply,  then  following  UR  tariff reductions  (i.e.,  year
2001),  the  Canada-U.S.  tariff rates  will  decline  to  zero  by  2011.  If so,  the  Canadian
supply management  sector  will  have  a  significant  adjustment  to  deal with.  In practical
terms,  farmers  may  have  to  face  a  decline  in  industrial  milk  prices  of some  20  to  30
4 Editors Note:  A  reviewer observes that  interprovincial  disagreements  have begun  to  erode
some of the rent  seeking  capability  of this  cartel  arrangement.
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percent  as  Canadian  prices  adjust.  There  may  also  be  adjustments  in  the  rest  of the
industry  in  terms  of competition  with  U.S.  processors  and  marketing  strategies  more
generally,  in addition to the  farm price decline noted.  It is also  likely that  ice  cream  and
yogurt  prices  may  decline  to  U.S.  levels  more  quickly,  following  resolution  of  the
outstanding  GATT  Panel  on  Canada-United  States  trade  in  these  commodities.  These
kinds  of changes  will be difficult  enough  for the  industries  affected with  a  lead time of
ten years, but they will become more  and more  difficult by year if  they are  not anticipated
or planned  for by  the affected  industry  groups.
Canadian Wheat Board  (CWB)
Of all marketing  boards  in  Canada,  the CWB  is the  largest  and most  important.
It  was  formed  in  1935  and  is  essentially  a  centralized  state  trading  agency  selling  all
wheat  and  barleys grown  in  its  designated  area  of western  Canada.  Its  four  major
objectives,  as  set out  in legislation  (Loyns  and  Carter,  1984)  are:
i)  to  maximize  producer  returns  from  the marketing  of CWB-area  wheat and
barley,
ii)  to provide  producers  with federal  government-guaranteed  initial payments,
iii)  to  equalize  prices  for the  same  grain  across  all producers  and  within a  crop
year  by pooling,  and
iv)  to equalize access  to the  grain delivery  system, hence  the available  markets,
by  the use of delivery  quotas.
To meet these objectives,  the CWB has very wide powers, basically  monopoly rights  over
the  acquisition,  storage,  movement  and  sale  of all  wheat and barley  grown  in the  CWB
designated area, whether  for export or domestic food grain markets,  and the power to limit
access to the grain handling and transportation system.  It has the obligations  to accept all
grain  delivered,  make  initial payments  and  give  producers  their  rights  to share  in pool
proceeds.  To  do this  it is given  the monopoly powers  mentioned-the  sole exporter  and
importer of wheat and barley,  the sole transporter,  and the  sole buyer and seller of grain
for  both export  and domestic  purposes.
The rationale  for these powers  is,  in part,  to  gain marketing advantages,  to offset
perceived  monopsony  powers  in  the  international  grain  trade,  to  achieve  potential
economies  of scale  in  transportation  and  marketing  and  to  gain  higher prices  in  certain
markets  when  it  has  the  market  power  to  do  so  (i.e.,  practice  price  discrimination).
Whether  it has  such  market power  is  a matter of some  debate.  It is a  sizeable player in
the  international  wheat trade,  but  it works  among  another  half dozen  or so  large  sellers
that  constitute  its  main competition.  The result is that  it has  little overall  market  power
to  affect  prices,  although  in  specific country  markets  in  specific  periods and for  certain
grades  it may have  a limited degree of influence  over the prices  it receives  if most of the
other sellers  are  not active  in that  market.
5 The  use of the  term  "grain"  in  the discussion  of the  CWB  is  meant  to  include  wheat  and
barley.  However,  the  Government  of Canada can  add  or  delete  grains  from  the  CWB's authority,  as it
did  by  deleting oats  in  1989.
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Another important  element of the CWB's mandate  is the  pooling of returns.  All
revenues  from  sales are placed in a pool for  each grain quality designated,  against  which
grain  selling  costs  are  subtracted  (transportation  costs  are  not  pooled,  so  the  net  price
received  by a producer  is the pool unit revenue  less the  cost of transportation  and handling
at a particular  delivery point).  The pool  is debited for the cost of the initial payment,  and
after all  other  revenues  and  costs  for  that grain  year  are  tallied,  the remaining  revenues
are  divided  among  pool  participants  per  unit  of  grain  contributed.  The  objective  of
pooling  is to  achieve  equity  among  producers.  Pooling  is designed  for  all producers  to
share  within  a  given  crop  year  in  the  timing  of  sales,  different  sales  opportunities,
infrastructural  constraints,  and CWB costs.  It is not intended that revenues  from different
grain qualities  are  pooled,  nor is it intended  to pool revenues  from  different  locations  of
production  (i.e.,  transport  costs  are  not pooled).
To understand the effects of this agency it is also important to know what the CWB
does not do.  It has  no taxing power or revenue  source other than the revenues it receives
from its  sales.  In the literature  on state-owned enterprises,  the  CWB would be  described
as  facing a  "hard"  budget  constraint.  As  a result,  it cannot  subsidize  grain  prices.  And
despite its  pooling obligations  and powers,  it cannot stabilize prices  between  years.  The
"initial payments" made  for wheat are administered  by the  Board, but their level  is set and
guaranteed  by  the  federal  government.  If the  initial  payment  is  higher  than  the  price
obtained  on the market,  the  federal  government  will underwrite  that payment,  paying the
CWB  for any  losses  incurred.  This  has occurred  in the  past  decade  or two,  but rarely.
All  it  can  do to  raise  producer  prices  is  to  sell more  effectively,  using  its  single  desk
selling advantages  and  its  small amount  of market  power  in  certain  markets.
It  is beyond  the terms of this paper to evaluate this complex institution,  but we can
note several  issues of contention  surrounding  the  CWB  and the  grain  sector  in  general.
Most of these  issues relate  to  the monopoly  powers  and  regulations applied,  and include
grain marketing,  transportation  and handling.  First, the  effectiveness  of CWB marketing
has  been  debated,  most  recently  surrounding  the  question  of whether  the  barley  market
should  be  opened  up,  instead  of remaining  under  Board control.  Second,  the  transport
costs  associated  with  the  WGTA  have  been  contentious  for  reasons  of  local  market
distortions  (as  a tax  on  users  (further  processors)  of grain),  budgetary  costs and  trade
policy  obligations.  Thirdly,  the control  and  regulation  of elevator  and  handling charges
have  been  raised  more  recently,  particularly  with  how  the  higher  charges  faced  by
Canadian  grain growers  compared  to those  in the  United  States  will affect  the Canadian
industry's competitiveness when there has been a substantial  increase in cross-border  grain
flows  since,  but not  necessarily  caused  by,  the  Canada-United  States Trade  Agreement
(CUSTA).
OTHER POLICY  INSTRUMENTS
There  are  a  variety  of other  policy  instruments  that are  less important  that those
already  discussed  but  that  are  very  relevant  for  particular  commodities  and  in  certain
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regions.  We will only deal  with three:  tariffs  and trade  policy,  research  and  extension,
and  sustainable  agriculture.
Tariffs and Trade Policy
This  general  policy  instrument  is  highly  important  within  Canadian  agriculture,
given  the generally  open  trading  environment  found  in  most  of the  agricultural  sector
(e.g.,  grains  and oilseeds,  and red meats).  For these sectors,  the most  important aspect of
trade  policy  is  the  access  to  foreign  markets,  given  that  these  commodities  are  export
competitive  and their  sales  revenues  are  heavily  dependent  on  export  markets.  Trade
policy from a domestic perspective is particularly important within the supply management
sector  because  its main  element  of protection  has been  a set  of restrictive  import quotas.
Any changes  in these  restrictions  could have important income  implications  to the sector
and  would  be  closely  scrutinized  by  the  industry.  This  was  readily  observed  in  the
Uruguay  Round  negotiations.  However,  these issues  have already  been discussed  under
previous  headings.
An area that has  not been discussed  is the  use of tariff protection within  Canadian
agriculture.  This is important  in the horticultural industry where tariff protection  has been
a primary  component of its protection,  particularly  for vegetables.  It is also important  in
the  context  of recent  trade  agreements  because  all  tariffs  are  being  reduced  to  zero
between Canada and the  United States under CUSTA  in a ten year process begun in  1989.
One  indication  of the  importance  of this instrument  to  the  horticultural  sector  is that  in
1992,  its value was estimated  to be $29 million,  only slightly more than  10 percent of the
total government  program  benefits  the  industry  received  that year.  The  other main area
of tariff protection  in  the  Canadian  food sector  is on  certain processed  foods, where the
tariff is protecting  food  processors  and,  indirectly,  farm  producers.  In the  future,  there
will  be some  increase  in areas with tariff protection,  due to  the Uruguay Round process
of tariffication  of existing quotas  and other non-tariff protection.  Within  Canada, this  is
leading to  significant tariff levels  on the  supply managed  commodities,  where new over-
quota tariffs  will range  from  150 to  350 percent,  for poultry,  egg  and  dairy  products.
An area of growing  importance,  involving what  are  in effect  tariff surcharges,  is
the  use  of countervailing  and  anti-dumping  duties.  As  other  forms  of protection  are
declining,  claims  for  either  of  these  contingent  protection  measure  are  growing,
particularly between  Canada and the  United  States.  Many of these  have been introduced
by the  United  States  and  imposed  on  Canadian products.  Two  examples  where  Canada
has  levied such duties  are  the  corn  countervail  and  the anti-dumping  surcharges  on Red
Delicious  apples being  imported  into British  Columbia.
Research  and  Extension  Activities
Agricultural  research  is not  directly part of trade disputes, but it has been  a major
expenditure  area  for  many years  so it is discussed  briefly.  In conjunction  with extension
expenditures  noted  below,  this  has  been  the  major  government  program  area  with  the
objective  of increasing  farm  productivity.  In  1992,  federal  research  expenditures  were
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$232  million,  roughly  the  nominal  level  around  which  research  spending  has  been
maintained  for the  last decade.  In addition the provinces  contribute  to research programs
at a level of about one-third of federal  government  spending, roughly  $75 million in  1992,
although  the  level  varies  considerably  by province.
Increasingly,  federal  research spending has been allocated  to avoid duplication with
private  sector research.  These  funds  are  aimed  at projects that  are  likely  to  benefit the
country  as  a whole  but that  the  private  sector,  working  alone,  is unlikely  to  undertake.
There are also initiatives where Agriculture Canada engages  in joint projects with the food
industry.  The two main priorities for research  funding by Agriculture Canada are projects
that will  improve the health  and safety  of the  food supply,  and those  that will add value
to  Canadian agricultural  production.  With  the  goal of communicating  research  findings
to farmers,  extension activities have  also received a relatively high priority  in government
spending,  although  for constitutional  reasons these are the responsibility  of the provincial
governments.  This  spending has amounted  to  about $130  million or just more  than half
of federal  research  spending.
The  importance of spending in this category  can be seen by the high rates of return
to research  investments,  and by  the difference  it makes  in competitiveness  by increasing
productivity  in a sector  with higher yielding fruit varieties  or improved  crop varieties  like
canola.  Even  if research  and extension  expenditures  are  added,  the  total  is  in the  range
of  $350  to  $400  million.  This  can  be  compared  to  total  market  sales  of Canadian
agriculture  of $21  billion,  in which case  all research  and extension  expenditure  amounts
to no  more  than two  percent of market  sales.
Sustainable  Agriculture
This  is  another  policy  area  that  is  not  usually  considered  as  relevant  to  trade
disputes,  but is worth noting because of the rapid growth  in attention to sustainability and
environmental  issues,  and  because  the  total  expenditures  involved  are  no  longer  small.
For  constitutional  reasons,  most  of this spending  has  come  through  federal-provincial
programs  or  directly  from  provincial  initiatives.  Expenditures  usually  are  for  a  large
number  of small  projects.  Basically  this  category  includes:  irrigation  (dealing  with
irrigation,  soil  loss  and  water  quality  externalities);  providing  public  goods  such  as
wildlife habitat;  providing  water infrastructure;  and encouraging  changes  in certain  farm
practices.  The activities  financed under this  heading are  focused  on the conservation  and
development  of the  soil  and water  resource  base  (reducing  soil  degradation,  improving
water  systems);  the  development  of better  systems of farm  practice;  tree  culture;  water
supply;  land utilization and land settlement (such  as removing marginal  lands from annual
crop production  into permanent  cover);  the improvement  of water habitat for wildlife;  and
economic  diversification  more  generally  within the  regions.
The  main area  for  such spending  is the three  Prairie provinces,  although  some  of
the  programs  are  cost-shared  federal-provincial  programs  that  can  be joined  by  other
provinces.  The number of programs  and total resources  in this  area has been growing, but
budget  cuts will likely reduce  federal spending  in the coming years.  For example,  federal
government  spending  in this  area  for  the  1993-94  fiscal  year  was  $101  million,  but the
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comparable  estimates  for  the  coming  year,  1995-96,  are  $65  million.  To  see  these
expenditures  in  more  perspective,  federal  and  provincial  research  and  extension
expenditures  amounted  to  no  more  than  2  percent  of  farm  cash  receipts  from  the
marketplace,  while  sustainable  agriculture  federal  expenditures  at  their  high  point  in
1993/94 were  only  one quarter  of total research  and  extension  expenditures.
There  are a host of other government  programs that affect farmers,  but their effects
are  small  in  relation to  those  already  discussed.  It is  beyond  the  scope  of this paper to
cover more  of these programs.  One program  area  that  has not  been mentioned  but that
has  grown in importance  over the last decade is program assistance beyond the farm  gate,
in the area of assistance to  processors  and  market  development  activities.  Even  if these
expenditures  go  directly  to other parts  of the food chain,  they usually  benefit  farmers  as
well.  However,  one  policy  area  that  has  large  effects  and  hence  should  at  least  be
identified is the area of favourable  tax provision available to farmers--the  effects of which
are termed tax expenditures.  While there has been  a trimming  in recent years  of special
tax advantages  for the population  at large,  these  cuts have  tended not to involve  farmers.
One  example  is  the  capital  gains  lifetime  exemption  of  $500,000  that  was  initially
available generally,  but is now available  only to farmers  and small businesses.  There  are
few estimates  of the value of these  tax expenditures,  but an  estimate  of the value  of one
provision,  this  favourable  capital  gains  tax  treatment  (compared  to  no  such  lifetime
exemption)  is  relatively  large.  Measured  in  1981  dollars,  the  present  value  of this
advantage  is  $3.2  billion.  On  an  annual  basis,  this  one  component  of existing  tax
expenditures available  to farmers would  be worth at least $320 million, comparable  to the
major,  not the  largest,  farm  program  expenditures.
COMMODITY  BY  COMMODITY  REVIEW
In this section farm policy in Canada is discussed by each of four major commodity
groups  instead  of  by  instrument  as  was  done  in  the  preceding  section.  The  four
commodity  areas  included  are  i)  red  meats,  ii)  grains  and  oilseeds,  iii)  supply
management,  which includes dairy, poultry and eggs, and  iv) horticulture,  including fruits
and vegetables.  The  numbers that we will use to quantify the program benefits  to farmers
are what have come to be known as  "net benefits"  (Gellner,  1991).  They  are not what one
would  describe  as  the net economic  benefits  to farmers,  but rather could be described  as
the program  expenditures  or financial transfer incurred,  on the simplifying assumption that
if a dollar were  spent on the program,  farmers  benefitted  by a dollar.  They could also be
described  as  supply-demand  rectangles  of transfers,  ignoring  any welfare  triangle  losses.
In the  case of market  regulatory  programs  that raise consumer  prices  but  do not involve
taxpayer-financed  transfers,  the estimated  program benefits  are  calculated  with reference
to border prices (e.g.,  the difference  in price between that which was actually received  and
that which would have been received if the  commodity were  imported).  The  most recent
period for these calculations  is 1992,  and unless otherwise  noted, all net benefits numbers




This sector includes beef and hog farmers,  which covers some 75,000  farmers.  Its
farm  cash receipts  over the last  four  years  (1990-93)  has  ranged  between  $7.9  and  $9.7
billion,  or  $115,000  in  cash  receipts  per  farm.  The  net  benefits  that  this  sector  has
received  from federal and provincial government program expenditures for 1992 was $503
million  or between  5 and 7 cents per  dollar of cash receipts,  depending upon the  level of
farm  cash  receipts  used.
7 The  main programs  contributing  to this  level  of net benefits
were  safety nets  (specifically NTSP),  industry  infrastructural  expenditure,  local property
and fuel tax relief, and miscellaneous  input subsidies (credit  and Feed Freight Assistance).
The NTSP program expenditure accounted for  1/4 of all net benefits ($130 million)
by itself, and industry infrastructure programs (research,  extension and inspection services)
accounted  for $170  million,  together  constituting 60  percent  of all  transfers.  Local  tax
relief ($35  million)  and input subsidies  (credit and  Feed Freight Assistance,  $32  million)
added  another  15  percent.  The  balance  of expenditures  are  mostly from  a large  number
of small  programs  and  projects,  especially  from the provincial  governments.  There  is a
negative program effect  on  red meats  that is  included,  from the higher  feed costs due  to
the  Western Grain Transportation  program.  There was  an expenditure  program to  offset
the  effects  of the  "Crow"  in Alberta,  but the  net  effect  of both programs  combined  was
negative,  and  largely  offsetting  the  local  tax relief and  input  subsidy programs.
The most significant  recent program  change  in the last few years  is the termination
of NTSP,  the  largest  single program  support.  What  is now  remaining  is a  set of small,
heterogeneous  programs  contributing  only  3 to  4  cents  of  support  per  dollar  of  farm
revenues.
Grains and Oilseeds
In the grains  and oilseeds sector there  are approximately  90,000 farms  with annual
farm  cash  receipts  over  the  1990-93  period  in  the  range  of $6.5  to  $7.3  billion,  or
$75,000-80,000  per  farm.  Total net benefits  to this  sector,  however,  were  a little  more
than  $3 billion  in  1992.  This  illustrates  a  rather  striking  difference  in  support  across
commodities.  Compared  with red meats, the  grain and oilseed  sector is a little smaller in
farm  sales  and  involves  some  twenty  percent  more  farmers,  but  receives  government
program  support,  mostly  expenditures,  that  are  at least six times  larger.  On  a dollar  of
cash  sales,  these  income  transfers  amount to  40-45  cents.
Almost  ninety  percent  of this  government  support  arises  from  five  programs.
Safety nets (largely  GRIP, NISA, and Crop Insurance) contribute  half of this support ($1.6
billion),  the  WGTA  transportation  subsidy  counted  for  another  quarter  ($0.8  billion),
6 The data for this  section were  obtained  by personal  correspondence  from  Statistics Canada
and  from  unpublished AAFC  data.
7 At the actual  level  of farm cash receipts  for  1992,  $9.150 billion, the net benefits  this sector
received  from  government  programs  were  5.5  cents  per  dollar of cash receipts.
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infrastructure  in the  form  of research,  extension  and inspection  cost $170  million,  local
tax exemptions added  $315 million,  and several  credit subsidies added  $36  million.  This
list covers 87 percent of the total net benefits,  and the balance  is due to  a variety  of small
programs,  from irrigation  and  soil conservation  activities  to  farm  debt  review and credit
sales  on  exported  grain.
As in the case of red meats,  recent program  changes will have  a significant  effect
on these  net  benefits,  mostly  to  reduce  the  levels  of support.  Two  changes  alone,  the
removal of the WGTA grain transportation subsidy and a reduction  in safety net programs
including withdrawal  from the  GRIP  program,  will remove  over half of this sector's  net
benefits.  In the short run there will be a one-time offset payment,  but in the medium  term
the  cuts will  be  felt directly,  reducing  net benefits  as reported.
Supply  Management
This sector covers the dairy, poultry and egg  sectors,  which affect 30,000 farmers.
Farm cash receipts  in this sector amount to $5.8 billion,  or an average  $190,000 per farm.
Net benefits  are  $2.4  billion  in  1992,  or equivalent  to  41  cents on  every  dollar of sales.
In  this  sector  the  net benefits  arise  primarily  from  market  regulation  (i.e.,  import  and
production quotas),  making the sources of net benefits particularly concentrated  compared
to other sectors.  In fact,  the import quota and domestic supply control  regulations  account
for  $1.9  billion  in  net  benefits,  the  federal  dairy  subsidy  (direct  deficiency  payment)
accounts  for  $225  million,  and  research,  extension  and  inspection  activities  add  $122
million.  These  three program  areas add up to $2.25  billion, or 93  percent of all transfers.
The remaining  7  percent  arise  mostly  from  small provincial  programs.
Recent program changes  in the  government  budget will have  a small effect  on the
net  benefits  enjoyed by  this sector.  The  dairy subsidy  will be  cut  over two  years by  1/3,
but that  will reduce  expenditures  by  only  $70  million,  or  a reduction  in  net benefits  of
only  3 percent.  The Uruguay  Round will affect  the net benefits  from  market regulation,
but at this time the only effect will be via a small increase  in import quotas.  In the longer
run,  there will likely  be  tariff reductions  and  when  these  become  binding there  will  be
reductions  in program benefits,  but those effects  are not likely to be seen for some years.
Horticulture
This is the smallest of the sectors covered,  including only 9000 farmers.  Farm cash
receipts  have  ranged  between  $1.1  and  $1.3  billion  over  the  period  from  1990  to  1993,
and this  amounts  to $130,000  per  farm.  Net benefits  for  1992  in this sector  were  $280
million,  or  23  percent  of farm  cash receipts.
When  disaggregated,  these  net  benefits  arise  from  four  major  areas.  The  most
important  are  the safety net programs,  such as NTSP,  NISA  and Crop Insurance,  which
account  for $84 million or 30 percent of total net  benefits.  Tariff protection  is valued at
$29  million  (10  percent  of total  benefits).  Research,  extension  and  inspection  services
account for  $70 million (25  percent).  Local  tax assistance  amounts  to another  8 percent
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of the total.  The balance  is due to a series of small programs,  mostly  grants and subsidies
at the  provincial  level.
The  recent  changes  are  planned  termination  of the  NTSP  program,  and  a  steady
reduction  in  tariff  levels  due  to  the  Canada-United  States  Trade  Agreement  and  the
Uruguay  Round.  However,  as tariffs  are already quite low, removing them will have little
effect.  The more  significant effect will  be the reduction  in safety net spending and ad hoc
financial  programs  arising  from  federal  and  provincial  government  budget  cuts  in the
future.
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
Agricultural  policy in Canada incorporates  a wide array of instruments,  complexity
in  programs  and  implementation  regulations,  and  in some  cases,  very  large  transfers  to
producers.  This discussion has  focussed  on the policy instruments  which  account for the
bulk of financial  transfers.  There  are other programs,  particularly  at the provincial  level,
which  were  excluded  because  they  are  relatively  small.  The total  value  of transfers  in
1992  was  $7.1  billion.  Of this,  $3.7 billion  were  due  to  federal  government  programs,
$1.9 billion were from provincial programs,  and $1.5 billion arose from federal-provincial
cost shared programs.  Of this $7.1  billion total,  $5.1  billion was from  direct and  indirect
financial  transfers  while  $2  billion  was  the  dollar  equivalent  benefit  from  market
regulations  but where  the cost is  paid for  consumers  instead  of taxpayers.
When  one  looks  at  individual  programs,  there  are  many  differences  between
Canadian  and U.S.  programs,  with much greater  emphasis  in Canada  given  to safety  net
programs  and  market  regulation.  Import  and  domestic  quotas  are the heart of Canadian
supply  management  regulation.  There  is  much  less  use  of  direct  subsidies,  such  as
deficiency  payments  and  export  subsidies  in  Canada,  than  in  the  United  States.  The
reasons  for  these  different  choices  are  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper  but  one  can
speculate  that  the  importance  in  Canada  of  selling  onto  the  world  market,  and  the
implications  of that for price stability,  is  a major  explanatory  factor.
Whatever  the  reasons  for the  existing program  mix,  it is clear  from  events of the
last year  or two  that the  programs  and  instruments  used  in Canada  are changing.  There
is a  general  movement  at both  federal  and provincial  levels  to  programs  that will  cause
fewer trade  actions and be designated  as  "green"  in terms of the GATT.  Similarly,  there
is  a  shift  away  from  large  programs  that  are  costly  to  taxpayers,  to  less  expensive
programs  that share  costs with producers  and give them a greater  say  in how those funds
are to be spent.  The  February  28,  1995 budget  gives  ample and recent  evidence of such
a shift.
Another observation  on the  Canadian agricultural  policy situation  is how wide the
differences  are  in public  support  across  commodities.  When  calculated  as  a percent  of
farm  cash receipts,  government transfers  to the  red meat  sector constitute  only  5 percent,
while transfers  to the grains  and oilseeds sector and the supply management  sector (dairy,
poultry  and eggs)  constitute 40  to 45 percent.  Within the  next few years,  this  range will
57Proceedings
widen (perhaps  temporarily)  as  red meats  commodity support  should decline by  about a
third.  Grains  and  oilseeds  support  should  fall  by  one-third  to  one-half.  Supply
management  support  may not show much decline,  however  given that new tariffs  will be
prohibitive.
Looking ahead,  there  are two  factors  that  will dominate  policy developments  for
at least the next five  years.  These  are the two underlying  reasons  for the recent program
changes that have been announced:  the political  priority being given to budget cuts at the
federal  and provincial  levels  in order to reduce  government deficits,  and the  importance
to  Canada and  our trading partners  of new trade  agreements.  An immediate  question  is
whether  these  changes  will  be  superficial  or  temporary.  Is  it  likely  that the  politics  of
support to Canadian  agriculture  has changed,  or will current  budget cuts and trade policy
issues  fade after  several years,  and  allow the  underlying  political economy  factors  to re-
emerge  as they  have  in the  past,  with only some  re-instrumentation.
It  would seem  at this  point that  these  changes  may  be  more  permanent.  What
appears to  have changed this time is  the underlying politics.  Through  trade agreements,
our  trading  partners  now  put  limits  on  what  Canada  can  do  in  terms  of  international
policies,  and the implementation of domestic  policy.  This  shift in power means stronger
competition  for Canada's farm  lobby  groups.  For example,  it is no secret that U.S.  dairy
farmers  believe they  have a right to access  Canada's domestic  dairy  product market,  and
that pressure  from  the United States  on this matter will be in conflict with Canada's  dairy
lobby  in Ottawa.  Similarly,  Canada's  wheat competitors  on  the world  market  will have
some  influence  on  what is  defined  as  an  export subsidy.  The  WGTA  constituted  such a
subsidy,  and  was removed.
In the  case of the budget,  there  is now a new or strengthened  lobby  that demands
budget  cuts,  and this  runs  against the  interests  of some  farm  groups.  The  result  is  a
reduction  in  agricultural  spending  programs  that  will  signal  a  shift  in  influence  from
certain  farm  groups  to  taxpayer  interests.  Although  there  will  be  some  substitute
programs,  this  is  likely only  to  offset  partly the cut  in budget that  is now  occurring.
If these  interpretations  are correct,  there will be more constraints placed on market
regulatory  policies  and reduced  budget expenditures  on  farm programs  in Canada in the
coming  decade.  These  will  be  in  the  direction  of smaller  financial  transfers  or  their
equivalent.  With  these  developments,  programs  will  be  less distorting  to international
trade and funding will be allocated  in areas where there  is a broader consensus of support.
For example,  spending will be more likely in pursuit of international competitiveness  and
environmental  sustainability.  This  will  produce  a  larger  number  of  well  focussed
programs  that are less costly.  Demands  from farm  lobbies will continue,  but they will be
met  by options  within  the  constraints  of budgets  and possible  trade actions.
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